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As a result of increasing pressure to control the rising costs of the Civilian Health
and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAM PUS), the Department of
Defense developed a comprehensive reform package known as the CHAMPUS Reform
Initiative (CRI). The CRI utilizes fixed-price contracts, health enrollment and
preferred provider contracts to contain costs, enhance health benefits and ensure high
quality medical care. This study is a critical comparative analysis of the strengths and
weaknesses of the CRI which ultimately may effect its success or failure.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE PROBLEM
The Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services
(CHAMPUS) is a program designed as an alternative medical resource available to
dependents of active duty members, retirees and their dependents, and dependents of
deceased active duty and retired personnel. CHAMPUS was conceived as a secondary,
back-up resource to relieve pressure on overcrowded military treatment facilities
(MTF).
The MTF is the primary source of medical care for eligible miUtary beneficiaries.
Care is provided essentially cost free to the beneficiar}' so long as resources are
available. If medical care is unavailable for whatever reason, care may be sought from
a civilian source utilizing CHAMPUS. CHAMPUS operates like many major medical
insurance plans. The beneficiary is required to pay an annual deductible plus,
depending on beneficiary status, 20 to 25 percent of the remaining allowable costs.
The government pays the remainder. [Ref 1: pp. 4-44 - 4-46]
Over the last several years CHAMPUS has come under mcreasing criticism. It is
considered to be outdated. It does not utilize current health industry cost-containment
techniques. It is too costly, too complex, and the benefits are inadequate to meet the
needs of today's military families.
In response to these criticisms, the Department of Defense (DOD) has sponsored
an overhaul oi" CHAMPUS currently known as the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative or
CRI. The CRI would achieve its goals of cost containment, enhanced medical benefits,
and increased patient satisfaction by utilizing fixed-price contracts to civilian health
care providers. Under these contracts all the medical needs of eligible beneficiaries
would be met by a coordinated effort of military facilities and civilian preferred-
provider networks. Congress, after some lengthy discussion and with some
reservations, has authorized a limited demonstration of the Initiative along with a
phased implementation.
Proponents of the CRI hold it up as a panacea for all the military medical
departments' woes. They claim that if fully implemented, it would cure not only the
current ailments of CHAMPUS, but also medical combat readiness problems, medical
manpower shortfalls, and all else that might currently plague the military health service
system (MHSS). [Ref. 2: p. 2]
The issue here becomes what will the CRI do? Will it. can it, under its current
design, achieve what its proponents claim? Or is the CRI a disaster in the making?
B. BACKGROUND
The primar>' mission of the MHSS is to provide medical support to U.S. combat
forces during war. The VIHSS has been additionally tasked with providing a quality
health benefit to active duty and retired members of the Armed Forces, their
dependents and survivors [Ref 3: p. C-2] -- in all over nine million eligible beneficiaries.
To accomplish this mission, the military operates 168 hospitals, 500 frestanding
medical clinics, and 400 dental clinics. Manning these facilities are 43,030 health
professionals, including 13,222 physicians, 5,021 dentists, 11,636 nurses, plus
veterinarians, optometrists, podiatrists, pharmacists, psycologists, nurse practitioners,
physician assistants, and others. In addition, over 146,000 enlisted and civilian
personnel are utilized in support roles. [Ref 3: p. C-2]
The VITFs are divided among the three major services: Army, Nav\', and Air
Force. Each service medical department is organized differently and operates its
facilities independently of the other services. In the Air Force, for example,
commanders of MTFs come under the direct control of the base commander, while in
the Army, MTF commanders are answerable to an Army-wide central Health Services
Command. In the Navy, MTF commanders report to Regional Medical Commands
who in turn are under the central Naval VIedical Command. [Ref 3: p. C-3]
For 1987, DOD has budgeted SIO.S billion for medical operations. Of this total,
Sl.Tbillion is earmarked for CHAMPUS. The CHAMPUS program is operated by the
DOD through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
(OASD HA). There are currently five regional fiscal intermediaries (insurance carriers)
contracted to process claims for CHAMPUS. [Ref 3: p. C-2, C-3]
The cost of health care has risen dramatically over the last ten years. In 1985
health care costs rose 7.5 percent nationwide. This is compared to only a 1.7 percent
rise in the consumer price index. [Ref 4: p. 2]
The MHSS has been hit hard by these increases, particularly in the CHAMPUS
side of the house. Between 1980 and 1986 total CHAMPUS costs increased on average
17.4 percent per year while medical care costs in the private sector increased only 11.2
percent per year, on average. During this same time frame federal health care spending
other than CHAM PUS increased only an average of 10.6 percent per year. [Ref. 5: p.
22] In 1983 CHAMPUS costs totaled SI. 2 billion. By 1985 They totaled S1.4 billion.
SI. 7 billion is budgeted for 1987, but projections indicate the final total will come in
around SI. 8 billion. It is estimated that by 1988 costs uill run in the neighborhood of
S2.06 billion. [Ref 6: p. 22]
An additional factor in this is that CHAMPUS as currently legislated is an
entitlement. This means that if the total CHAMPUS cost exceeds the CHAMPUS
budget Congress must provide all the additional dollars. There is no legislative
discretion on this. If a beneficiary qualifies for care under CHAMPUS, that person
receives the care, and CHAMPUS must pay the bill.
Utilization of CHAMPUS has also grown tremendously. In 1983 there were 4.9
million claims submitted. By 1986 this number had risen to 7.2 million claims.
[Ref 6: p. 22] CHAMPUS is no longer the minor back-up program it was originally
designed to be.
Part of the utilization problem hes in the changing structure of the population
served. The All-Volunteer Force and civilian/military pay comparability have joined
forces to give the American servicemember more financial freedom and security than
ever before. This new-found security has resulted in a dramatic rise in the married
population of the military. In 1981, for example, 40.8 percent of Navy enlisted
personnel were married. By 1985 this rose to 47.4 percent, a 6.6 percent increase in the
population overall, but a 16.2 percent increase in the married population. During this
same time frame married populations in the Marine Corps and the Army rose 29 and
22 percent, respectively. [Ref 7: p. 1] These increases translate to more dependents,
and an increased demand for obstetric, gyncological, and pediatric care.
Recent medical blunders have also contributed to the rise in utilization of
CHAMPUS. Malpractice suits [Ref 8: p. 39] and highly publicized incidents, such as
the Commander BiUig^ case, have resulted in the implementation of extensive quality
assurance programs which take valuable resources away from direct patient care,
reducing facility capabilities. This translates into more CHAMPUS referrals.
^Commander Donal M. Billig, a Navy surgeon at Bethesda Naval Hospital was
tried in 1986 on charges of involuntary manslaughter in the deaths of five patients
between 1983 and 1984. He was also charged with dereliction of duty for performing
twenty-four heart operations without supervision by a cardio-thoracic surgeon.
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Increased attention to the medical departments' combat readiness have been the
result of such incidents as the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon.
Follow-ing a review of after action reports on that incident, Dr. William E. Mayer, the
Assistant Secretary- of Defense for Health Affairs, testified before House and Senate
Armed Services Subcommittees that, if the dead-to-wounded ratio resulting from that
bombing had been reversed (there were many more dead than wounded), "it would
have been not just an embarrassment, but a scandal." He further stated that, if the
U.S. were involved in a full scale war at that time (1985), 65 percent of our casualties
would not receive the surgical care they would need. Furthermore, he predicted that it
would take two years (until 1987, now ) to reduce that number to 50 percent, and that
it would be 1992 before the military medical departments would be fully combat ready.
[Ref 9: p. 10]
The renewed emphasis on combat readiness has also taken its toll on direct
patient care, as more medical assets are devoted towards training programs and the
development of fleet and field operational units. This again results in more
CHAM PUS referrals.
C. REASONS FOR CONDUCTING THIS ANALYSIS
There are several benefits to be derived from this study.
• The costs of the current CHAMPUS system have been increasing at rates far
outstripping similar health programs both inside and outside the federal
government. \n understanding of why this is happening will help us to better
evaluate the proposed reform initiative and suggest adjustments needed to
ensure successful attainment of its goals.
• CHAMPUS, whatever its form, is a needed and necessary program. That is,
under the current MHSS organization it is needed and necessary. It provides
an important health care benefit to military dependents and retirees.
Enhancement of this program could have a positive effect on recruitment and
retention. It would most certainly improve the image of military medicine and
increase basic morale among military families.
• Although CHAMPUS represents less than one percent of the total DOD
budget, it is almost 20 percent of the DOD health budget. [Ref 3: p. C-2, C-3]
In this day of funding cutbacks where each million is carefully scrutinized, a S2
billion-plus expenditure can become significant. It is vital that we obtain the
most efficient system for our money.
• If the CRI is successful in achieving its goals, it could very well contribute to
resolution of the military's other medical woes. If the patient load and mi.x can
be adjusted as proposed, combat readiness of our medical forces could be
enhanced and manpower shortages and overcrowding alleviated.
D. METHODOLOGY
The methodology to be used in this study is a critical comparative analysis of
current and historical literature on the military and civilian health care industries,
CHAMPUS, and the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative. The CRI \^ill be evaluated in
light of industr>' recognized practices and experiences with similar experiments.
Chapter II of this thesis will briefly outUne the primary criticisms of the current
CHAMPUS system. It will also set forth the key features of the Reform Initiative and
how these features are supposed to solve CHAMPUS's problems.
In Chapter III summaries of selected writings and studies relating to the CRI
and similar experiments will be presented. This wll provide the backdrop against
which the CRI will be evaluated.
A discussion and analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the CRI will be
presented in Chapter IV. This will lead to the final conclusions and recommendations
presented in Chapter V.
10
II. THE CHAMPUS REFORM INITIATIVE
A. CHAMPUS TODAY
The increasing pressures on the CHAMPUS program have served to emphasize
its shortcomings. These shortcomings tend to be universally recognized, and on the
whole, fall into the following categories;
1. Difficult Access and Poor Coordination
Access to medical care is often difficult to achieve and coordination between
civilian and militan,' providers is poor at best. [Ref 3: p. 10]
Gaining access to a MTF is often the first problem encountered by the
patient. Available appointments are few and are quickly filled. This problem is worst
for patients with acute needs requiring "same day" care. If no appointments are
available the patient must choose between long hours in clinic or emergency waiting
rooms or seeking care from a civilian source and hoping CHAMPUS will honor their
claim.
Under current policy, if needed medical care is unavailable at a military facility
the patient may request a certificate of non-availability. This authorizes the patient to
seek care in the civihan community under CHAMPUS coverage. The problem here is
that the patient is simply pointed in the direction of the civilian world and told he must
find his own care. .VIilitar>' providers are not authorized to make referrals to any
specific civilian provider. The patient is left to his own judgement on who will best
meet his medical needs. Once cut loose the patient is on his own. [Ref 1]
A closely related problem is that once a patient leaves the military health care
system, there are no provisions to recapture any follow-on or subsequent care that
might be available at the MTF. The patient is simply lost to the civilian referral
system for at least that episode.
2. CHAMPUS Authorized Care Inadequate
The available types of care authorized under CHAMPUS do not meet the
needs of today's military families. [Ref 3: p. 10]
This is most evident in the area of primary outpatient care. Outpatient clinics,
especially pediatric, well-baby, and OB'GYN clinics are in many areas severely
overcrowded. This type of care under CHAMPUS requires payment of deductibles and
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co-payments which make it an economically poor substitute and in the case of many
young and growing military families economically unfeasible. [Ref 3: p. 10]
The claims procedures associated with CHAMPUS use are complicated and
reimbursements are often delayed. This adds to the beneficiaries' frustration with using
CHA.VIPUS, and at times results in the patient not even submitting a claim, just to
avoid that frustration.
3. CHAMPUS Costs Have Become Excessive.
As mentioned earlier, the costs associated with CHAMPUS have skyrocketed
and continue to rise in spite of moderated growth trends in the national health care
mdustr>'. [Ref 3: p. 10]
B. CHAMPUS REFORMED
The key features of the CRI have been specifically designed to resolve the three
problem groups listed above.
1. Improve Access and Coordination
Two features of the CRI are to provide better access to medical care and
better coordination between civilian and military providers.
a. Health Care Finder
The CRI requires the contractor to develop a "Health Care Finder"
program. The concept of this program is that of a gateway -- one entry point into the
total health care system. An eligible beneficiary in need of medical care contacts the
"Health Care Finder" office in his area. This central office then channels the patient
into either the military or civilian networks depending on his needs and the availability
and capabilities of the providers. Referrals between the two networks are also handled
through the "Finder". [Ref 3: p. C-14 - C-19]
The concept of the " Finder" is simple. By channeling all patients through
one gateway it eases entry into and through the system. It eliminates confusion about
where to go to get needed care. All care is coordinated through one office so
continuity of care can be maintained. It provides for the most efficient use of medical
resources as patients can be channeled to the provider who can best and most
efficiently meet their needs.
b. Resource Sharing
Another aspect of the CRI that enhances this goal is the resource sharing
feature. Resource sharing involves the use of civilian providers in military facilities. In
many cases the capabilities of a MTF are restricted only by manpower resources. In
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such cases the contractor would provide civihan providers {MDs, nurses, etc.). The
MTF would provide the physical support (workspace, consumables, etc.). Such an
arrangement would allow for the most efTicient use of existing physical resources.
[Ref. 3: p. C-22]
2. Enhanced benefits.
Three features of the CRI are designed to enhance health benefits for eligible
beneficiaries.
a. CHAMPUS Prime.
This is a health enrollment plan not unlike a civilian Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO). Voluntary- enrollment in this program obligates the enroUee to
obtain all medical care through the contractors network of providers. In return the
contractor agrees to provide their care at no or nominal cost. These networks are
made up of both military and civihan providers accessed through the "Health Care
Finder". [Ref 3: p. C-5 - C-U]
The advantage to enrollment is that the contractor can identify the
population he serves and can better (more efficiently) plan for their care. The patient
benefits because he receives all needed care at no or nominal cost -- no claims forms,
no deductible, no co-payment.
b. Preferred Provider Networks,
This feature would utilize the same provider network as CHAMPUS Prime,
but does not require enrollment. Beneficiaries would be encouraged to use these
provider networks. As an incentive to do so, the cost, although more than for an
enroUee, would be significantly reduced from the 20 to 25 percent co-payment under
the old CHAMPUS plan. [Ref 3: p. C- 11 - C-12]
c. Quality Assurance.
Providers contracted as part of the CHAMPUS Prime and preferred
provider networks would be screened and monitored under a strict quahty assurance
program. This program would involve both internal and external peer review groups
along with a utilization review committee. This design would provide to the
beneficiary the highest quality of medical care possible. [Ref 3: p. C- 19 - C-21]
3. Regional Fixed- Price Contracts
Regional contracts would be awarded through a competitive bidding process
to civihan comnpanies. The winning bidder would assume responsibihty for
development and execution of all features of the CRI, thus contracting to provide
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health care to all eligible beneficiaries within the prescribed areas. [Ref. 3: p. ES-3]
Using a contract process like this would provide the following advantages.
a. Nationwide Buying Power
It would utilize the nationwide buying power of the federal government.
Open, competitive bidding relies on economic forces to achieve the most benefit at the
least cost. [Ref 3: p. ES-3]
b. Contractor Assumes Financial Risk
A fi.xed price contract places the contractor at financial risk. This gives the
contractor the incentive to find the most economically efficient method of providing
the required medical care. [Ref 3: p. ES-3]
c. Military/Civilian Partnership
It sets up a partnership between the military facilities and contractor
provider networks which promotes better continuity of care and cooperation between
military and civilian providers. [Ref 3: p. ES-3]
C. SUMMARY
The features of the CRI discussed in this chapter have been developed in direct
response to criticisms of the current CHAMPUS system. Each of these features will be
evaluated in the light of information presented in the following chapter. By examining
the parts we hope to be able do draw conclusions about the health of the Initiative as
a whole.
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III. PREVIOUS STUDIES AND THEIR FINDINGS
The concern for the rising costs of health care is shared worldwide. This concern
is mirrored in a multitude of writings in books, periodicals and newspapers. In this
chapter, sununaries will be provided of some of the more recent and pertinent writings
on the CRI and related issues in the civilian community.
In response to a Congressional mandate and under the direction of OASD HA
the Rand Corporation did an extensive study entitled "Health Care in the Militan.-,
Feasibility and Desirability of a Health Enrollment System" (June 1984). In this study
they developed the idea of the MHSS organizing itself as an enrollment plan not unUke
the CHAMPL'S Prime preferred provider aspects of the CRI. In their plan, the role of
the contractor would be played by the MTFs instead of a civiUan group. In practice it
would function very much like the CRI, and it would have the same objectives.
[Ref. 10]
The following are some of the more pertinent conclusions of the Rand study.
[Ref. 10: pp. 2, 33-35]
The costs of such a program are almost impossible to predict. Among the
unknown costs that could be incurred by DOD if such a program were implemented
are:
• Beneficiary co-payments arising from the current CHAMPL'S program.
Sufficient data are not available to even approach an accurate estimate of these
costs.
• Benefit payments currently paid by other insurance companies on insurance
held by eligible beneficiaries. This is estimated to be somewhere between S.5
billion and Sl,5 billion per year.
• Other payments from frustrated CHAM PUS MTF eligible beneficiaries. There
are no data available from which any reasonable estimate could be made.
Full implementation of a program like that outlined in the CRI will require major
changes in the organization and management of the MHSS. A demonstration project
might have to take place without these changes. This in itself could lead to the failure
of the program demonstration.
After completion of the Rand study the OASDTIA developed their initial
proposal for CHAMPL'S reform. The CRI was met with immediate skepticism. In an
August 14, 1986 report from the House Appropriations Committee, the CRI was
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criticized as being overly ambitious. It said there were too many important items not
finalized. [Ref. 4:' p. 1]
In "A Report to Congress on the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative," published in
November 1986, the OASD/HA defended its position and discusses the
demonstration/phase-in implementation aspects of the CRI. It expresses great
confidence that its plan will provide "... a true test of the Reform Initiative, enhance
marketplace competition, facilitate nationwide implementation if successful, and
maintain program stability if unsuccessful." [Ref 2: p. 15]
The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) was asked by the Chairman.
Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation, House Committee on Armed
Services, to monitor the CRI. The GAO published a report in March 1987 which
identified three issues it considered to be unresolved at that time [Ref. 11]:
• Program costs may increase not decrease.
• Beneficiar>' satisfaction may not increase.
• Under the CRI program complexity may increase.
In light of these issues GAO recommended:
• Expeditiously develop a means of evaluating the demonstration phase. The
basis upon which success or failure will be judged has not been clearly
identified.
• Assure that the demonstration phase is long enough to allow for a thorough
evaluation.
• Immediately inform Congress if the mandated timetable will not allow for
adequate test and evaluation of the program.
About this same time Robert Hale, the Assistant Director of the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO), is quoted in the Savy Times (11 May 1987) as saying that, from
their estimates, CHAMPUS Reform ". . . might save as much as S400 million when
fully in place. There is also the possibility that people who currently are not using
CHAMPUS benefits, but who are eligible for benefits, could be attracted back into the
system. If that happened, in the extreme case, we estimate that you could add to cost
by as much as S800 million." [Ref 12: p. 10]
In an earlier, but related report from the Blue Ribbon Panel on Sizing DOD
Medical Treatment Facilities published in March 1985, the panel evaluated the cost-
effectiveness of CHAMPUS against direct care in a MTF. The primary conclusion of
this report was that in seven studies conducted since 1982 every one of them found it
less expensive to build, expand, and man our own facilities rather than rely on
CHAMPUS for health care. [Ref 13]
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The issues of cost containment, incentives, and quality of care have been
discussed extensively throughout the health care industry. David Whipple, [Ref 14]
points out the need for some means of measuring health care output, without which,
management control over costs, and incentives to be efficient, will remain ineffective.
He goes on to recommend drastic changes in the organization of militarv- medicine. If
the cost of health care in the MHSS is to be brought under control, all costs must be
taken and controlled as a whole, Costs under CHAM PUS cannot be segregated out
and handled separately. He recommends that the MHSS should be organized on a tri-
service, regional basis, with budget authorizations, including CHAM PL'S, being
allocated down to the MTF level. Local and regional authorities should be given total
control and accountability for the health care needs and costs within their geographic
zones of responsibility. [Ref 14: pp. 255-256]
The manner in which health care resources are organized and allocated, and the
organization's effect on the quaUty of health care provided has been widely discussed.
In his book, America's Health in [he Balance, Choice or Chancel, Howard H. Hiatt,
M.D.. discusses these and many other aspects of health care in the United States.
Three topics are of particular interest to this study.
The first topic is that of the "Gatekeeper". Dr. Hiatt points out the need for one
access point to health care. A reference point through which all care is sought and
coordinated. This gatekeeper maintains the health record. This is necessary to ensure
continuity of care and help reduce time and money, lost to repeating what has been
done before. [Ref 15: p. 48]
Second is the idea of change within a system. Dr. Hiatt cautions care in
initiating change. "Changes in one part of the system often have unexpected elTects
elsewhere." [Ref 15: p. 70]
The third topic he discusses is that of redundant systems in health care.
Treatment facilities in the same area are offering the same services and each facility is
operating below capacity.
Dr. Hiatt's conclusion is essentially the same as Dr. Whipple's, namely, that
health care systems should be organized on a regional basis. All health care resources
in the region should be controlled from one regional headquarters. All health care
funds for the region, federal, state, and local funds, as well as private funds are all
funneled through and controlled by the regional headquarters. He considers this to be
"essential to the workings of the program." [Ref 15: p. 190-208]
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Wolinsky and Marder in their book The Organization of Medical Practice and the
Practice of Medi'cine, [Ref. 16] draw two major points from their research. 1) The
practice of medicine is affected by the differences between prepaid and fee-for-service
reimbursement. 2) Certain organizational arrangements can facilitate cost
containment. Such organizations are of the more bureaucratic forms which provide
greater inducements through peer review. "It is in the utilization review and control
mechanisms that the future lies." [Ref 16: p. 147- 154]
The problem of containing costs while maintaining high quality health care has
been widely studied and written about. The CRI would appear to have many of the
needed elements recognized as necessar>' to accomplish its goals. There are also many
questions which are not answered at this point. In the next chapter a more detailed
analysis of the CRI will be conducted. The key features presented earlier will be
examined in the hope of drawing an overall conclusion about the viability of the CRI.
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IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
In Chapter II the three major goals of the CRI were introduced along with the
key programs designed to attain those goals. In this chapter the key programs will be
evaluated. Strengths and weaknesses will be presented, and a preliminary conclusion
drawn on the contribution of each program towards attainment of the goals of the
CRI.
A. TO IMPROVE ACCESS AND COORDINATION
Two programs were identified in Chapter II as being primary contributors to
achieving the dual goals of improving patient access to care and improving
coordination of care between military and civilian providers.
1. Health Care Finder (HCF)
a. The Program
The features of the HCF program are aimed at achievement of both these
goals.
(1) Access. The HCF program seeks to improve access to care by
expanding the possible access points. Under the current system, a patient seeking care
can choose to go to a MTF, where long waits are the norm, or a civilian provider and
hope CHAMPUS will honor the claim. Telephonic access to an appointment desk is
also possible, but the hours are restricted and "same-day" appointments for an acute
episode are very limited.
Under the HCF program the number of access points is increased by
one. Patients seeking care may also go to any contract provider and receive the needed
care, with the assurance that they are covered under CHAMPUS. Access by telephone
is also expanded. The HCF program requires the contractor to maintain a 24 hour a
day appointment/information service.
(2) Coordination. The HCF program would improve coordination and
continuity of health care by implementing a central coordinating agency or
"gatekeeper". This agency would be responsible for:
• Maintaining the 24 hour appointment; information service mentioned above;
• Maintaining health records and insuring patient medical records are accessible
at the point of health care delivery.
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• development and implementation of a routing and referral system which ensures
continuity -of care and optimal utilization of the MTF while preserving patient
freedom of choice and preference for individual and/or type of provider.
b. The Problems
Although the designers of the HCF program had improved access and
coordination in mind when the program was outlined, there are some problems which
may, to var}"ing degrees hamper the attainment of those goals.
The primary problem is a conflict between the DOD/patient desire for easy
access and the contractor's need for control.
The designers of the program seem to equate accessability with the number
of ways that the system can be approached. Coordination through a gatekeeper is
achieved after the initial patient contact. The patient would perhaps agree that this
represents improved access and coordination.
The contractor on the other hand would take a different viewpoint. His
survival is dependent on his making the most efficient use of available resources. To
do this he must control the utilization of those resources. He must approach access
and coordination as a means of controling resource use.
The provisions of the HCF program severely restrict the control of the
contractor over access, but that might not be devastating if the contractor can
formulate the referral and routing procedures in a way that would allow him to regain
the lost control. The resulting referral and routing system, although designed to
coordinate and control, may be perceived by the patient as infringing on his freedom of
choice and overall access to care.
c. Conclusion
Overall the use of the Health Care Finder as specified in the CRI will do
ver>' little to improve access to and coordination of health care. The patient's desire
for ease of access and freedom of choice will be in direct conflict uith the contractor's
need for control of resource utilization in order to provide efficient, cost effective care.
Initial access may be improved, but access to follow-on or specialty care may be
percieved by patients as restricted.
2. Resource Sharing
a. The Program
The coordination of patient care and efficient resource utilization are the
goals of the resource sharing program. In support of these goals this program would
allow the use of contract civilian providers in the MTF. These providers would
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function as MTF stafT members utilizing MTF facilities and equipment. This
arrangement could" be used to alleviate military' manpower shortfalls and to make use
of the excess capacity available at many facilities, thus improving the efficiency of the
MTF. The contractor gains through expansion of the least expensive medical resource
available to him.
The patient benefits because the expanding of health resources at the MTF
would allow more care to be provided at that location. Coordination and continuity of
care could be simplified and enhanced if care is kept within a single system.
b. The Problems
In spite of the apparant strengths of the concept of resource sharing, there
is one fact which may weaken the overall contribution of this program to goal
accomplishment. The fact is that the link between the MTF and the contractor is at
best a weak one and there is little hope of strengthening it under this type of an
organizational structure. The reasons for this are:
• The contractor has no control over resources within the MTF. Although he is
charged with ensuring their efficient use, he has no real authority. The MTF
commander has ultimate responsibility for ever>'thing that happens within his
facility.
• The goals of the MTF commander and the contractor are not the same. In
peacetime the MTF commander's primar>' mission is to ensure medical combat
readiness of his command, and the active duty forces in his area of
responsibility. Secondarily he is to provide care for the other DOD
beneficiaries as space is available. The contractors primary goal is secondary
to the MTF. In a situation where conflict existed between primary goals the
MTF commander's would prevail.
c. Conclusion
Resource sharing is a solid plus for the MTF in expanding its capacity and
improving its resource utilization. But, because of the lack of control within the MTF
and the possibility of conflicting goals, the contractor may be reluctant to make full
use of the program's possibilities. The overall result may be little real improvement in
coordination or efficiency of care.
B. ENHANCED BENEFITS
Benefit enhancement under the CRI is to be achieved using two different
strategies. The first is an expansion of the types of health benefits offered under
CHAM PUS coverage. The second is to improve the quality of care provided under
CHAM PL'S.
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1 . Expand Health Benefits
In an effort to expand the benefits available to beneficiaries under
CHAMPL'S, the CRI offers two programs -- CHAMPUS Prime and Preferred Provider
Networks.
a. CHAMPUS Prime {CP)
This program is the heart and soul of the CRI.
(1) The Program. The benefits of an enrollment system like CP, to both
the beneficiary and the contractor are recognized throughout the health care industry.
To the contractor an enrolled population means an increased ability to
tailor his organization to meet the specific health needs of the populace he serves. This
knowledge allows him to prescreen the providers for quality of care and cost efficiency.
He can reduce the excess capacity or wasted resources associated with planning for a
need that may not materialize. The money saved, through better resource planning,
allows the contractor to offer more benefits for the same or fewer dollars. In theory,
CHAMPUS will fund its own benefits expansion through the CP program.
The beneficiary gains through CP because he gets more benefits and
pays less for them. Under CP medical care received would be at no or nominal cost.
This situation is preferrable to a deductible plus co-payment. Medical care under CP
therefore becomes an economic substitute for care in a MTF.
An add-on benefit to the contractor under CP is better control of
resource utilization. By choosing to enroll in CP the beneficiary agrees to utilize the
CP provider network. The patient preference is locked in for the period of enrollment.
This reinstates some of the control lost to the expansion of access discussed earlier.
(2) The Problems. There are weaknesses that will have to be overcome if
CP is to be fully successful in accomplishing its goals.
Enrollment plans like CP have proven themselves in the civilian
community with rather stable populations. Mihtary populations are considered to be
anything but stable. Although the trend is towards more "homesteading", a significant
portion of any given military community will transfer in the course of a year. The
effect this instability will have on the program as whole is unclear, but it most certainly
could complicate CP eligibility verification and enrollment procedures.
Another problem could be the enroUee's and the MTF's perception of
enrollment entitlement for the beneficiary. A recurrent theme throughout the CRI is
that the MTF is to be utilized at maximum optimality. This technically places the
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MTF within the CP network.. It is hard to conceive of a MTF commander agreeing
with this conclusion. The militar\- benefician.' may not see it either. 1 he result could
ver\- well be that the enroUee would turn to the civilian CP network for care leaving
MTF resources underutilized.
(3) Conclusion. On the whole CP is a program that, if implemented
correctly, could allow for expansion of health care options. The weaknesses cited
should not prove overpowering. The eligibility and enrollment problems should not
hamper resource planning to a great degree because the militar}' population is rather
homogeneous and the movement of personnel is in most cases well balanced.
The perception problem is the most serious and is the result of a
recurring situation in all programs of the CRI. namely the separation of powers. The
military and civilian systems are separate and saying they are to work as one. wont
make it happen! They are responsible through dilTerent command chains and funding
chains. Each has their own separate gods to appease. Neither has any real control in
the other's camp. In its prescribed form CP should not be totally undermined by this
problem., but the program will be weakened and may fall short of its full potential.
b. PrefeireJ Provider iSetworks
(1) The Program. Preferred provider networks have been used
successfully in the civilian community. In function, this program sits somewhere
between enrollment plans like CP and fee-for-service plans like the current CMAM PL'S
program.
The advantages of using a network of preferred providers is that the
providers can be prescreened for cost and quality of care. This allows for some degree
of resource planning, but as the population is not known to the same degree as in
enrollment pains, cost controls are not as tight and savings are not as great. This
limits the benefits expansion possible under such a program.
Another advantage to using a preferred provider network as required
by the CRI is that beneficiaries using the network would be drawn in under the HCF
routing and referral network. Under standard CHAMPL'S, beneficiaries become lost to
the civilian community's referral system. Under the CRI, specialty and Ibllow-on care
are retained in the system avoiding the extra cost associated with care outside the
contractors provider network.
(2) Fhe Problems. The first of the weaknesses of a preferred provider
network was alluded to above. The utilization patterns of an undefined population are
less easy to plan for. This means that resources cannot be as closely fitted as is
possible under an Enrollment system. Savings are not as great, therefore benefits could
not be expanded to the same extent.
The most significant weakness is not with the preferred provider
program itself, but with its coupling to the CP program. Under the CRI, beneficiaries
who choose not to enroll in CP may still utilize the CP provider network, and in fact,
are encouraged to do so. The effects on the CP program are still unclear since it
doesn't seem to have been tried before. One thing does seem evident though. The
strength of an enrollment plan lies in its knowledge of who it serves. Its provider
network is tailored to the needs of its enrollees. Therein is the basis for cost savings,
which allows for enhanced benefits. By introducing an undescribed population into the
resource planning process are we in fact transforming an enrollment plan (CP) into a
preferred provider network. We are weakening the effectiveness of the program we are
counting on most.
One last problem that may be encountered if the CP network doubles
for the preferred provider is in the incentives to enroll or not to enroll. Access to care,
etc. will all be the same for the enroUee and the non-enrollee. The only difference
would be in the cost of that care. The enroUee would pay less out-of-pocket, but how
much less? If the incentives to enroll are not high enough, there will be those who will
choose not to enroll simply to preserve their full freedom-of-choice. How high should
the incentives be? Its never been tried before so time and experience will have to set
the level.
(3) Conclusion. A preferred provider network by itself is a program which
has proven its ability to help contain costs and enhance benefits, but as described in
the CRI it may do significant damage to the CP program. This would lessen the
overall benefits that could be derived if CP were left to itself
2. Improve Quality of Care
The second strategy to be used to enhance benefits is to improve the quality
of care provided to beneficiaries under CHAVIPUS. Under the current CHAMPUS
program, DOD has no real way to effectively monitor the quality of care provided. By
implementing the CP and preferred provider programs health care providers are




Under the CRI quality of care would be monitored by three programs:
• Internal Quality Assurance;
• External Quality Assurance; and
• Utilization Review.
As these programs are similar in organization and function they will be discussed as
one QA;UR program.
The obvious strengths and benefits of a QA/UR program are that:
• They establish credentiahng standards for providers;
• They extablish protocols and procedures for identifying and resolving quality
and utilization problems before they become a significant liability;
• They set standards for appropriateness of treatment pattern; and
• They provide a database of utilization patterns for use in future planning
activities.
b. The Problems
The primar}' drawbacks to QA/UR programs are that the require an
extensive and costly administrative support system, and they draw expensive and scarce
medical practitioners away from the practice of medicine, into administrative duties.
c. Conclusion
The establishment of QA/UR programs is no longer an industry option.
The programs as outhned in the CRI are patterned after DOD's own programs. They
are working well within DOD and if implemented correctly, should produce the desired
improvements in the quality of care and the utilization data needed for good resource
planning.
C. CONTROL OF HEALTH CARE COSTS
The use of regional fixed-price contracts is set forth by the framers of the CRI as
the major factor to be used in controling health care costs. In defense of this decision,
three advantages of using fixed-price contracts are set forth. Each of these advantages
will be examined and evaluated for applicabiUty to this situation.
1. Nationwide Buying Power
The theor}' behind this advantage is that the federal government controls a
large amount o^ money. The size of these contracts (S200 million - S600 milUon) is
expected to draw a large number of bidders. The economic forces at work during an
open competitive bidding process are expected to produce the lowest possible cost for
the required level of health care.
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The major problem here is the supply side of the issue. The federal
goverrmient can create a demand, but supply may not be adaquate to produce a
competitive market. Are there enough health care organizations within our economy
with adequate resources and experience to provide sufficient competition to drive the
cost to its lowest level?
Even on the subregion level (the smallest region), the size of the contract is
expected to be S200 million. Each contractor would be expected to provide all the
programs outlined in the CRI. Civilian health care organizations, for the most part,
have experience with one or the other major elements of the CRI. Their organization
is based on either an enrollment, a preferred provider, or a fee-for-service program --
not all three. Experience with a comprehensive program like the CRI is practically nill.
Potential bidders would be treading on unknown ground, making the risks extremely
high.
If the supply side cannot provide enough bidders with the experience and
resources to handle such a large and diverse program the result could very easily be a
monopoly; oligopoly market, or even a no-bidder market. In either case the federal
government's buying power is no real advantage.
2, The Contractor Assumes the Financial Risk
Under a fixed-price contract the contractor agrees to provide all services
required by the contract for one given price. This type of agreement provides
incentives to the contractor to operate at the most cost efficient level as possible. The
incentives are derived from the fact that no more money will be forthcoming. Failure
to stay within the contract budget could result in financial disaster leading to contract
failure and loss of the contract. The financial risks belong to the contractor. This type
of arrangement presently used in the civilian sector and has been successful in helping
to keep costs under control.
The initial draft of the CRI left all of the risk with the contractor. The
response of potential bidders was that the risk was too high. Subsequently, risk sharing
features were added in writing the final draft. These features provide safeguards to the
contractor to help him avoid financial disaster. They provide for renegotiation of the
contract should unforeseeable economic or utilizaton problems drive costs upward.
By providing these risk sharing safeguards DOD may have fatally weakened
the incentives. The value of the fixed-price is the pressure it puts on the contractor to
meet or beat his budget objectives. Budget overages are money out of the contractor's
pocket. By opening the possibility of DOD covering budget overruns, the incentives
have been seriously weakened.
Although weakened, the incentives may not be destroyed if a competitive bid
can be counted on. In this case additional pressure is brought to bear on cost
containment, because competiton will hold ever\"thing m check. Running too far over
budget could mean a lost contract in the next bid. Can we count on a competitive
market? The discussion above leaves that in doubt. If a monopoly market prevails
DOD will be stuck with one contractor. With no competition and weak cost control
incentives the risks to the contractor become minimal. The value of a fixed-price
contract as a cost containment measure is reduced significantly.
3. Militan/ Civilian Partnership
The realities of the predicted military civilian partnership have been explored
earlier. Once again, briefly, the incentives to form such a partnership are weak. Two
autonomous camps with different goals and objectives, and wholely separate command
and funding chains will not produce the "partnership" desired. At best a weak liason
realationship, not so difTerent from the current situation, may result.
4. Conclusion
All in all, the three advantages listed by DOD, to using fixed-price contracts
are more hopes than true advantages. The very real possibility exists that the CRl
requires a program that is too large, too diverse, and too complex to attract enough
bidders to make these advantages real. There would be no program with no-bidder,
and should a monopoly result, very little or no progress towards cost containment
would occur.
D. SUMMARY
In this chapter the three major goals of the CRI have been revisited along with
their supporting programs. Strengths and weaknesses have been presented along with
analysis and conclusions concerning each program's contributions toward goal
achievement.
If the Reform Initiative were to work as planned it could indeed be the answer to
the MHSS's medical woes. Manpower shortages could be eliminated through resource
sharing. High quality heahh care benefits would be easily available to all beneficiaries
through the HCF and CP programs. Efficiency and effectiveness could be enhanced
resulting in controlled costs. Combat readiness of our Armed Forces could be
increased. Unfortunately in light of the problems cited in this chapter the possibility of
these things happening is slight.
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Taking all of the discussion of this chapter into account there are two major
obstacles to the full successful implementation of the CRI.
The first obstacle is the organizational structure of the military health services
system (MHSS). The MHSS is already a house divided. Army, Navy, and Air Force
medical organizations are always competing for scarce DOD health care funds. The
CRI replaces a passive support system (current CHAMPUS) with an active support
system. The CRI requires the active involvement of the contractor in the planning of
health care resources and their utilization. In many instances the wording of the CRI
gives the leading role to the contractor. The ideal would be that the contractor
become a unifying, coordinating force. The reality is that on many levels the
contractors will be perceived as a fourth competitor for DOD dollars.
Cooperation and coordination of effort among the four active participants will be
poor because:
• Funding and command/accountability chains are separate;
• Goals are diverse and in many cases conflicting; and
• Links between the four are blurred and weak.
The second primary obstacle to success of the CRI is the lack of civilian
organizations with sufficient resources and experience to successfully develop, and
execute a program as large and diverse as that required by the CRI.
These two primary obstacles will be the basis of the final conclusions and
recommendations presented in Chapter V.
V. CONCLUSIOiNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The primary conclusion of this study is that although CHAMPUS is in dire need
of reform, the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative is not the right vehicle of change.
Implementation of the overall program will prove to be a great disappointment. The
goals set forth will only be marginally realized if at all.
The reasons behind this poor performance are, first, as stated in Chapter IV, the
organizational structure of the MHSS will not allow it to succeed. Throughout the
readings and related studies one theme was repeated almost without fail: unity. For a
health system to control costs while providing an expansive benefit program, it must
control all the assets -- the manpower, the facility, and the funding -- through a
singular command chain. This is not the structure of the MHSS. Under the current
organization, resources are controlled through two parallel chains, the militar>' and the
civilian. This duality clouds the issue of accountability, the blame for failure, the praise
for success. No one is fully accountable for the total program at the operational level.
This lack of accountability makes structuring incentives to promote desired behaviors
essentially an impossibility.
Until DOD recognizes and corrects this fatal organizational flaw any attempt at
improving the programs offered within the organization will result in disappointment.
The second reason for the failure of the CRI to achieve its goals is the result of a
miscalculation on the part of DOD. That miscalculation was that the demand would
generate the required supply. In this case the supply side of the health care market
was unable to cope with the demand. There just are not the organizations within the
industry capable of providing what the CRI requires.
This conclusion has been borne out by the results of the bidding process. Very
few bids have been submitted for the areas involved in the first phase; test period. Of
the four test areas North Carolina/South Carohna received no response,
California; Hawaii and Georgia; Florida each received one bid, and New Orleans
received two bids. Since submission, the Georgia; Florida bid has been withdrawn,
causing one of the New Orleans bidders to also withdraw as that bidder was to relv
heavily on the Georgia; Florida bidder for administrative support. [Ref 17] If DOD is
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to continue with the program as devised it has only two areas left, with only one bidder
in each. The government's nationwide buying power, and the forces of our economy
have not produced competitive bidding. What has been produced is the possibihty of
regional monopolies. The CHAM PUS Reform Initiative is collapsing under its own
weight.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. PRIMUS and NAVCARE
If the CRI is dying, where do we go from here? CHAMPUS is still in
desparate need of reform. The literature reviewed has suggested one strong alternative
to CHAMPUS reform. That alternative is to scrap CHAMPUS altogether and use
CHAMPUS money to expand the PRIMUS/NAVCARE programs.
PRIMUS and NAVCARE are programs of the Army and Navy medical
departments. They are designed to provide non-emergency outpatient care to eligible
beneficiaries. The care is provided at no cost to the patient. The programs are
managed by the local MTF commander and funded through his command budget.
Local control allows for a tailor-made program to answer the needs of the MTF it
supports. [Ref 18]
PRIMUS and NAVCARE were developed to achieve the following goals.
• Provide quality outpatient clinical services to eligible beneficiaries.
• Reduce overcrowding and waiting times in primary care clinics at the MTF.
• Relieve medical manpower shortages.
• Contain/reduce the cost of medical care to military beneficiaries and military as
a whole.
Both programs are relatively new, but the services are so pleased with the
results that the currently contracted eight clinics will be expanded to 29 in 1988, and by
1992 the Army and the Navy hope to have a total of 52 such clinics in operation.
[Refs. 18,19]
Organized in this fashion the weaknesses and problems identified with the
current and proposed (CRI) programs could be
,
for the most part, overcome.
The Commander of the MTF is given control of all the funds and medical
resources. He also is responsible to provide all the required medical care for
beneficiaries within his zone of responsibility. Command and funding chains are now
one and the same. Accountability is also clearcut. Blame or praise are more readily
focused. Incentives can be designed more effectively and are more directly linkable to
the behaviors desired.
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By delegating the management of health care to the MTF level, the civilian
supply shortage is alleviated. The contracts could be reduced in size and complexity to
a level which would draw enough competition to allow economic forces to keep costs
under control.
These programs appear to share the goals and intent of CHA.VIPUS reform.
The program's organizational and funding structure seem to more closely appro.ximate
current thought on cost control measures and incentive development. PRIMUS and
NAVCARE deserve a good, close look as alternatives to CHAMPUS.
2. Preferred Provider Networks
The use of preferred provider networks in remote areas could enhance the care
of beneficiaries who reside outside the service areas of a MTF. These networks could
be managed by one of the services' regional commands, This would ofTer a cost
savings over standard CHAMPUS, it would allow for quality control and would
provide better utilization records.
3. Standard CHAMPUS
By implementing the first two alternatives, standard CHAMPUS could be
totally deleted. Organized as above outlined the MrtSS could provide for the needs of
all beneficiaries without using standard CHAMPUS. It is outdated and too expensive.
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